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Despite the crucial role played by transports in the sound development of the 
internal market, the new EU Regulation No 1215/2012 (“Brussels 1a Regula-
tion”) does not clarify the relationship between its own rules and the provisions 
on jurisdiction or recognition and enforcement of judgments laid down by the 
international conventions in the transport sector. 
As a matter of fact, the EU Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has laid down a test 
establishing the conditions upon which – pursuant to Art. 71 – issues of jurisdic-
tion or recognition and enforcement of judgments are to be dealt with in accordan-
ce with an international convention instead of with the Regulation. However, the 
said test (i) does not seem apt, as such, at ensuring that degree of predictability as 
to the courts having jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty for litigants, which 
– as remarked by the ECJ itself – should underlie judicial cooperation in civil 
and commercial matters; (ii) has been conceived with specific regard to the case 
when issues of jurisdiction or recognition and enforcement of judgments fall within 
the scope of application of both the regulation and the CMR convention. On the 
other hand, the so-called “disconnection clauses” – which can be almost invariably 
found in the acts whereby the EU has acceded to the various transport conventions 
and which serve the purpose of granting the primacy of EU law – raise problems 
as to how they should operate in practice vis-à-vis the Brussels Ia Regulation. 
In the light of the above still open issues, the paper is aimed at (i) ascertaining 
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whether the ECJ, in setting out the terms whereby the Regulation should interface 
with the transports conventions, will either stick to the approach so far consoli-
dated or revise it with a view to making it consistent with the principles of legal 
certainty and predictability as to the court having jurisdiction, (ii) clarifying the 
conditions that must be met for a given transport convention to be deemed to fall 
within the scope of Art. 71 of the Regulation; (iii) assessing how to handle the 
relationship between the Regulation and the transport conventions not covered by 
Art. 71; (iv) examining whether such relationship is governed by a specific clause 
(disconnection clause); (v) searching for an interpretative solution which permits, 
even in the absence of such a specific clause, to establish with a reasonable degree 
of certainty which provisions – among those of Brussels 1a and those laid down 
in the relevant transport convention – are to be applied for the purposes of esta-
blishing jurisdiction or recognising the effects of judgements in the case at stake.
Keywords: Brussels 1a Regulation, issues of jurisdiction or recognition and 
enforcement, disconnection clauses, transport conventions
introduCtion* 
The EU has progressively become an international actor in the fields of 
both private international law (“PIL”) and transports. As a consequence, inter-
actions are growing between the rules concurrently laid down on these matters 
by EU law instruments and international conventions. 
Such interactions give rise to practical problems with issues of jurisdiction 
and of recognition or enforcement of judgments: it has to be established which 
set of rules among those provided by the new Regulation No 1215/2012 (here-
inafter also referred to as the “Brussels Ia Regulation” or “Recast Regulation”)1 
* The present contribution is the result of a joint effort by both Authors and is uni-
tary in nature. Only for academic purposes, Part I is attributed to Chiara E. Tuo 
and Part II to Laura Carpaneto. 
1 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, 2012 OJ L351. This Regulation entered into 
force on 9 January 2013 and became applicable on 10 January 2015. It is therefore 
since this latter date that, pursuant to its Article 80, the new Regulation has replaced 
Brussels I. Further amendments to the Recast have recently been adopted, first, by 
Regulation (EU) No 542/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 May 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 as regards the rules to be 
applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice, 
2014 OJ L163; second, by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/281 of 
26 November 2014 replacing Annexes I and II of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2015 OJ L54. 
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and the relevant transport convention, respectively, is to be given precedence 
over the other. 
Article 71 of the Brussels Ia Regulation establishes a “non-affect” clause 
with regard to international conventions “on particular matters” to which EU 
Member States are parties, but in its practical application this rule has proven 
to be far from clear. 
In this context, the present paper intends to focus, in Part I, on the main 
problems connected with the interaction between Brussels Ia and the trans-
port conventions which (may be reasonably deemed to) fall within the scope of 
application of Article 71; in Part II, on the questions related to the interaction 
of the Regulation with the transport conventions not covered by Article 71 (or 
which may be reasonably deemed not to be covered by the said Article).
part i 
1.  BRUSSELS IA AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON “PAR-
TICULAR MATTERS”: THE “NON-AFFECT” CLAUSE CONTAI-
NED IN ARTICLE 71 OF THE REGULATION
In continuity with both the 1968 Brussels Convention2 and Regulation 
No 44/2001 (hereinafter also referred to as the “Brussels I Regulation”)3, the 
Recast Regulation provides a specific rule – namely, Article 71 – aimed at en-
suring that international conventions which Member States are contracting 
party to alongside with third countries, and which uniformly regulate jurisdic-
tion and recognition of judgments in relation to “particular matters” (such as for 
example, in the field of transports, arrest of vessels or international carriage of 
goods by road), fully display their effects and generally take precedence over 
the Regulation itself.
In that vein, Article 71(1) of the Recast Regulation takes into account, and 
aims to avoid that the Regulation’s provisions might overlap, if not even con-
flict, with those concurrently envisaged by specialised conventions, establishi-
ng that “any conventions to which the Member States are parties and which, in relation 
2 The 27 September 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters has been amended several times. A consoli-
dated version was published in 1998 OJ C27.
3 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of the Council of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
2001 OJ L12.
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to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments” 
“shall not be affect[ed]” by the Regulation itself.
The article at issue – framed in exactly the same terms as Article 71 of Re-
gulation No 44/2001 – has been commonly understood as aimed at giving pre-
cedence to international conventions regarding “particular matters” on the basis 
of the assumption that such conventions are designed to uniformly govern 
issues of international commercial law and that, as such, are generally acceded 
by a large number of States as contracting parties thereto.
The view has in fact been taken that – if read in these terms – the Article 
in question would have granted that international conventions on particular 
matters be duly complied with and, at the same time, the Member States be 
put in such a position as to accomplish them, thus avoiding the risk of incu-
rring international responsibility for any such violations.4
It is however worth noting from the outset that, unlike Article 57 of the 
1968 Brussels Convention5, Article 71 of the Regulation only refers to inter-
national conventions on “particular matters” to which Member States became 
contracting party prior to the date of entry into force of the Regulation.6
4 As in fact it is suggested by the content of the new Regulation’s Recital 35, accord-
ing to which “Respect for international commitments entered into by the Member States 
means that this Regulation should not affect conventions relating to specific matters to which 
the Member States are parties”.
5 For ease of reference, the content of the Article is hereby transcribed: “1. This Con-
vention shall not affect any conventions to which the Contracting States are or will be parties 
and which in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforce-
ment of judgments. 2. With a view to its uniform interpretation, paragraph 1 shall be ap-
plied in the following manner: (a) this Convention shall not prevent a court of a Contracting 
State which is a party to a convention on a particular matter from assuming jurisdiction in 
accordance with that Convention, even where the defendant is domiciled in another Contract-
ing State which is not a party to that Convention. The court hearing the action shall, in any 
event, apply Article 20 of this Convention; (b) judgments given in a Contracting State by a 
court in the exercise of jurisdiction provided for in a convention on a particular matter shall 
be recognized and enforced in the other Contracting State in accordance with this Convention. 
Where a convention on a particular matter to which both the State of origin and the State 
addressed are parties lays down conditions for the recognition or enforcement of judgments, 
those conditions shall apply. In any event, the provisions of this Convention which concern the 
procedure for recognition and enforcement of judgments may be applied. 3. This Convention 
shall not affect the application of provisions which, in relation to particular matters, govern 
jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments and which are or will be contained 
in acts of the institutions of the European Communities or in national laws harmonized in 
implementation of such acts” (emphasis added).
6 As in fact it can be inferred from the wording of Recital 36 of Brussels Ia, which 
reads: “Without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States under the Treaties, this 
Zbornik PFZ, 66, (2-3) 141-183 (2016) 145
The more restrictive scope of application featured in the Regulation’s provi-
sion rests on the exclusive external competence that the EU has in the meanti-
me acquired in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters 
as a consequence of the same adoption of Regulation No 44/2001.7 
As a matter of principle, this means that (i) Member States are no lon-
ger entitled to autonomously enter new conventions or amend existing con-
ventions which govern jurisdiction or the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in relation to “particular matters”; (ii) even if any such conventi-
ons were (wrongfully) concluded or amended by the Member States indepen-
dently of the EU, the rules on jurisdiction or the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments contained therein could not be deemed as falling within the 
scope of Article 71, that is to say that they would not be given any precedence 
whatsoever over the Regulation.8 And it is worth underlining that – owing to 
the said exclusive external EU competence in civil and commercial matters 
– any international conventions on these very issues that the EU has, or will 
have, entered into itself are in principle to be regarded as prevailing – albeit 
within the limits of their own scope of application and under the conditions 
set out below – over Regulation No 1215/2012.9
Moreover, it is noted that Article 71 of the Recast Regulation fails to indi-
cate the date relevant for the purposes of identifying the specialised conventi-
ons falling within its scope of application.
Regulation should not affect the application of bilateral conventions and agreements between 
a third State and a Member State concluded before the date of entry into force of Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 which concern matters governed by this Regulation”. 
7 That this is the reason for Article 71 Brussels Ia having been drafted differently from 
Article 57 of the 1968 Convention has in reality been appropriately set out by H. 
Ringbom, “EU Regulation 44/2001 and its implications for the International Mari-
time Liability Conventions”, (2004) Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 1, i.e. before 
than the ECJ reached the same conclusion by giving Opinion 1/03, of 7 February 
2006, Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, in Eur. 
Court Reports, 2006, p. I-1145 ff. On this opinion see extensively F. Pocar (ed.), The 
External Competence of the European Union and Private International Law, Padua, 2007. 
On the impact of Brussels I on the distribution between EU and Member States of 
external powers in PIL matters, see also K. Takahashi, “External competence implica-
tions of the EC Regulation on jurisdiction and judgments”, (2003) ICLQ 529.
8 In this sense see ECJ, judgment of 4 May 2010, case C-533/08, TNT Express Neder-
land, [2010] ECR I-4107, para 38. In doctrinal writings see P. Mankowski, in U. 
Magnus, P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, 2nd ed., München, 2012, Art. 71, 
note 3.
9 See below Part II.
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Indeed, at least on the basis of a purely literal reading of the article at hand, 
one could even allege that the “non-affect” clause thereby envisaged operates 
with regard to all the conventions to which Member States became contrac-
ting party prior to the same Recast Regulation’s entry into force, i.e. prior to 
9 January 2013.
This is not, however, the present authors’ view. As it will be set out below, 
in fact, Article 71 is to be read as applying only insofar as Member States have 
become parties to international conventions on “particular matters” before the 
entry into force of Regulation No 44/2001. 
In support of that position stands, first, the argument that, as seen above, 
the exclusive external competence as regards judicial cooperation in civil and 
commercial matters has shifted from the Member States to the EU as a result 
of the entry into force of Brussels I; second, the consideration that Regulation 
No 1215/2012 constitutes, both in form and in substance, nothing more than 
the last updated version of Brussels I, so much so that, as it results from its title 
and is further confirmed by Recital No 1, that Regulation is also referred to as 
the “Recast” of Brussels I. Hence, since such recast in no way regarded Article 
71, the specialised conventions referred to therein are to be considered – as 
under Brussels I – to refer to those, and only those, to which Member States 
became parties before 1 March 2002. Thirdly, the present authors’ position 
is confirmed in Recital No 36 Brussels Ia which, albeit pertaining to bilateral 
conventions or agreements between a third State and a Member State, clearly 
sets out that the “non-affect” clause provided by the Regulation operates only 
insofar as such conventions or agreements were concluded “before the date of 
entry into force of (EC) Regulation No 44/2001”.
Despite this conclusion being hardly disputable, it is nonetheless submitted 
that the EU legislature would have better served the objectives of legal certa-
inty and predictability which – as will be remarked below – underline the Re-
gulation if the new Article 71 had contained the clarification that the speciali-
sed convention shall not “be affected” provided that Member States are parties 
thereto as of the date of 1 March 2002.
2. THE COORDINATION MECHANISM BETWEEN BRUSSELS IA AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON “PARTICULAR MATTERS” 
AS CONCEIVED BY ARTICLE 71 OF THE REGULATION 
Except for the abovementioned difference, the relationship between the 
Regulation and the specialised conventions to which, at the time of the Bru-
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ssels I Regulation’s entry into force, the Member States were already parties, 
is governed by the new Article 71 in the same way as it was under Article 57 
of the 1968 Convention.
Given that Article 71 of Brussels Ia perfectly mirrors not only Article 71 
of Brussels I but also – save for the difference indicated above – Article 57 of 
the 1968 Brussels Convention, in accordance with Recital No 34 of the new 
Regulation10, that Article is to be interpreted in continuity with the reading 
elaborated by the ECJ for the purposes of interpreting the corresponding pro-
visions of both the 1968 Brussels Convention and Regulation No 44/2001.11
As such, Article 71(1) of Brussels Ia establishes that international conven-
tions providing for uniform rules on jurisdiction or recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in relation to “particular matters” “shall not be affected” by the 
corresponding rules laid down by the Regulation.
Thus, pursuant to Article 71 of the Regulation, issues of jurisdiction and 
of recognition or enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
should in principle be governed on the basis of criteria and rules other than 
those, of either general or specific character, laid down by the Regulation itself, 
i.e. the rules and criteria provided by the specialised convention coming into 
play in the case at hand.
In this regard, however, the position has been convincingly set out that 
Article 71 is rather aimed at fostering compatibility and coordination between 
the Regulation itself and the relevant specialised convention (i.e. at ensuring 
that such instruments supplement one another by means of a combined appli-
cation thereof).12 In other words, the objective of Article 71 is not that of 
10 Which reads as follows: “Continuity between the 1968 Brussels Convention, Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 and this Regulation should be ensured, and transitional provisions should 
be laid down to that end. The same need for continuity applies as regards the interpretation 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the 
Regulations replacing it”.
11 In these same terms see (albeit obviously with regard to the relationship between 
the 1968 Convention and Brussels I) paras 36 and 39 of the TNT judgment.
12 Reference is made to the opinion rendered by AG Tesauro in Tatry (Case C-406/92 
Tatry [1994] ECR I-05439), whereby he rejected the argument that in cases falling 
within the scope of application of a specialised convention the Brussels Convention 
was to be deemed completely overridden, regardless of whether or not the special-
ised convention concerned contained, for example, no lis pendens rule. In the AG’s 
view (as set out in para 8 of his opinion), the “non-affect” clause was not aimed at 
making the Brussels Convention totally irrelevant, but rather at allowing for a co-
ordination of the two instruments: “there can in my view be no question of Article 
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radically preventing the Regulation from ever coming into play in cases where 
its provisions are concurrent with those of a specialized convention. Rather, 
Article 71 is to be read as providing for the application of Brussels Ia on a 
subsidiary basis, whenever the need arises for the international convention’s 
provisions to be supplemented or completed as regards the specific procedural 
issue arisen in the case at hand.
It thus seems appropriate to define the Article at hand as an “integration 
clause” designed to embed single provisions from specialised conventions into 
the larger legal framework of the Brussels I Regulation.13 A confirmation of the 
above is eventually provided by Article 71(2)(b) of the Regulation, which esta-
blishes that if the relevant specialised convention fails to autonomously govern 
the recognition or enforcement of judgments, such issues are to be dealt with 
in accordance with the Regulation’s provisions.
3. THE ECJ’S APPROACH AS REGARDS THE CONCRETE OPERATI-
ON OF THE “NON-AFFECT” CLAUSE LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 
71: FROM THE TATRY Case ...
In light of the ECJ case law, however, it bears underlining that, in practice, 
the coordination mechanism conceived by Article 71 almost systematically re-
sults in the Brussels Ia Regulation being given precedence over the correspon-
ding provisions laid down in the relevant international convention, at least to 
the extent that the latter, despite providing for specific rules apt at governing 
the case at issue, is nonetheless deemed unsuitable to ensure that the same 
effects as those stemming from the application of Brussels Ia be displayed 
within the EU judicial area.
57 [as seen, the precursor of Article 71 of the Regulation] being interpreted merely 
as a subordinating provision, that is to say one which purely and simply affirms the 
primacy of the provisions of a particular convention, […] a provision by virtue of 
which, therefore, the existence of the connecting factors contemplated in the special 
convention means that the provisions of the Brussels Convention cannot be applied 
at all. […] on the contrary, a systematic reading of that provision shows that it is 
more in the nature of a coordinating provision, designed to allow the respective provi-
sions to be applied in combination” (emphasis added). 
13 As remarked elsewhere (C.E. Tuo, “Regolamento Bruxelles I e convenzioni su “ma-
terie particolari”: tra obblighi internazionali e primauté del diritto dell’Unione euro-
pea”, (2011) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 378), the mechanism 
whereby Article 71 makes reference to specialised conventions cannot be described 
as one of full integration of the latter into the former, but rather as one of “fictitious 
implantation” of single provisions from the relevant convention into the Regulation.
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In fact, it is undeniable that, starting from the Tatry case (i.e., since the very 
first occasion in which it was asked for the interpretation of the rule in que-
stion), the ECJ made clear that the “non-affect” clause contained therein “must 
be understood as precluding the application of the provisions of the Brussels Convention 
solely in relation to questions governed by a specialized convention”.14
The point to be dealt with in the aforesaid case was whether (the then 
applicable) Article 57 of the 1968 Convention could be interpreted as mea-
ning that a Member State court – seized in accordance with the relevant pro-
visions of the 1952 Convention on arrest of vessels15 – had jurisdiction over a 
dispute arisen out of a relationship which was already dealt with in the context 
of a parallel proceeding pending in another Member State between the same 
parties, albeit on the basis of different pleadings. 
The argument in favour of the alleged prevalence of the Arrest Convention 
was that since the second-seized court was to be deemed vested with jurisdic-
tion on the basis of a specific criterion as laid down by the said specialised 
convention, the entire 1968 Convention – included, therefore, the lis pendens 
provisions contained therein – could not even be taken into account by the 
Member State’s second-seized court.
However, the ECJ did not accept such argument. On the basis of the consi-
deration that the Arrest Convention, despite providing jurisdiction rules, no-
netheless fails to specifically address, let alone govern, the case of lis pendens, 
the Court in fact established that the discipline thereof was to be found in the 
1968 Convention. Accordingly, the gap affecting the Arrest Convention was to 
be closed resorting to the lis pendens provisions laid down in the 1968 Conven-
tion, which in fact resulted in the specialized convention being incorporated 
into the 1968 Convention’s scope of application.16
4. … TO THE TNT and NIPPONKOA deCisions 
It bears pointing out, however, that Brussels I has been found as prevailing 
also over international conventions which, unlike that on Arrest of vessels, do 
14 ECJ, judgment of 6 December 1994, case C-406/92, Tatry, [1994] ECR I-05439, 
para 24. 
15 Brussels International Convention of 10 May 1952 relating to the arrest of seago-
ing ships.
16 Result which – as pointed out by Mankowski (see fn 8 above) – is actually in line 
with the above mentioned subsidiary nature featured in Article 71 of the Regula-
tion (as well as by its precursor, Article 57 of the 1968 Convention, as applicable at 
the time when the Tatry case was dealt with).
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not contain any gaps whatsoever, but rather bring a set of provisions governing 
lis pendens and the recognition or enforcement of judgments in a complete and 
autonomous manner, albeit differently from Brussels I.
More specifically, the Court has been requested to clarify how Article 71 
should operate in case of judicial actions featuring such characteristics as to 
fall – albeit with effects totally irreconcilable with each other – within the sco-
pe of application of both the Brussels I Regulation and the 1956 Convention 
on the Contract for the International Carriage of goods by road (CMR).17
In short, (i) in the TNT case the Court was asked to establish whether the 
courts of a Member State are empowered to refuse the enforcement of another 
Member State’s judgment relying on the fact that such judgment has been 
given in violation of the CMR rules on lis pendens and that – pursuant to the 
same CMR, but differently from what provided by Brussels I – this violation 
may be invoked as a specific ground for the denial of exequatur.18
(ii) In the Nipponkoa case19, the Court was required to clarify if the judgment 
whereby a Member State court found a sub-carrier not liable for the damage 
occurred during international carriage of goods by road was to be deemed as 
having the same cause of action as a claim for indemnity filed in respect of the 
very same damage by the insurance company of the cargo’s owner. In fact, whilst 
according to the CMR the Member State court with which this latter action was 
filed should have been deemed vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon, 
the opposite conclusion was to be reached in case the Regulation was found to 
be applicable, as in such a case the seized court would have been bound to decli-
ne jurisdiction in accordance with the Brussels I rule on lis pendens.20
17 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of goods by road (CMR) 
1956, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 3999, p. 189. The parties to the Conven-
tion, which came into force in 1961, are 55, including all the EU Member States, 
whereas the EU is not itself a party.
18 ECJ, judgment of 4 May 2010, case C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland (fn 8 above).
19 ECJ, judgment of 19 December 2013, case C-452/12, Nipponkoa, ECLI:EU:C: 
2013:858.
20 In particular, the party (i.e. the insurance company) in favour of the applicability of 
the CMR took the view that despite the existence of a negative declaratory judg-
ment the court seized had jurisdiction under Article 31(1) of the CMR as that Ar-
ticle should have been interpreted autonomously and given precedence over Article 
27 of Regulation No 44/2001 by virtue of Article 71 thereof. The opposite view (i.e. 
the one taken by the defendant before the second-seized court) was that under both 
Article 31(2) of the CMR and Article 27 of the Regulation the proceedings could 
not be pursued on account of the negative declaratory judgment given previously 
by another Member State’s court.
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In both the abovementioned rulings, the Court confirmed the principles 
laid down in the Tatry decision, establishing that Article 71 was a provision 
aimed at coordinating the Regulation with the international convention co-
ming into play in the case at hand.21 But immediately after having made this 
clarification, the Court set out that such coordination is to be enacted without 
undermining the fundamental principles underlying the Regulation, the prin-
ciples specifically identified as those of “free movement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction and therefore legal 
certainty for litigants, sound administration of justice, minimisation of the risk of con-
current proceedings, and mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European 
Union”.22
Since Article 71 or, more precisely, the coordination clause incorporated 
therein, aims at fostering the application of specialized conventions only if, 
and to the extent that, the latter does not affect the abovementioned fun-
damental principles, such conventions shall therefore be precluded from dis-
playing any effect whenever their application might give rise “to results which 
are less favourable for achieving sound operation of the internal market than the results 
to which the regulation’s provisions lead”, as it would have happened, according to 
the Court, in the two cases at hand.23
Hence, the question raised in the TNT case was replied by the Court in 
the sense that a judgment given by a Member State court on the basis of an 
international convention dealing with a particular matter – such as, in the 
case at hand, the CMR – is to be enforced in accordance with the relevant 
Regulation’s provisions whenever the application of the corresponding, more 
restrictive provisions laid down by the relevant specialized convention would 
result in the enforcement of such judgment being subject to more stringent 
conditions, if not even denied.24
Should Article 71 be interpreted as aimed at giving precedence to interna-
tional provisions of such a character, in fact, the principle of free movement 
of judgments whereupon the Regulation’s regime on recognition and enforce-
21 See, in particular, paras 45-48 and para 36 of, respectively, the TNT and the Nip-
ponkoa judgments.
22 See para 49 of the TNT judgment and para 36 of the Nipponkoa judgment. Such 
principles, as set out by the Court, are enshrined in Recitals 6, 11, 12 and 15 to 17 
of the Brussels I Regulation.
23 In these terms, see para 51 and para 38 of the TNT and the Nipponkoa judgments, 
respectively.
24 See paras 54-55 of the TNT judgment.
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ment is grounded would be manifestly undermined, which in turn would se-
riously impair judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters as a crucial 
policy promoted by the EU for the sound operation of the internal market.25
Likewise, in the Nipponkoa case the Court preliminarily recalled that, pursu-
ant to the Regulation’s regime on lis pendens, Member States courts have no ju-
risdiction to try an action for the declaration of responsibility of the defendant 
if, in relation to the very same facts grounding such action, another proceeding 
has already been introduced by the defendant himself seeking a declaration 
that no such responsibility exists.26
The Court has therefore drawn the conclusion that the Regulation’s provi-
sions on lis pendens as well as those on recognition of judgments are to be put 
into play also when these types of actions are brought in accordance with the 
CMR within the EU judicial area.27
To reach the opposite conclusion would in fact result in the principles of 
not only minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings, but also free 
movement of judgments and mutual trust underlying the Regulation, being 
inadmissibly compromised.28
5. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE REGULATION AND THE 
TRANSPORT CONVENTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE ECJ CASE LAW 
ON ARTICLE 71 OF THE REGULATION: SOME CONTROVERSIAL 
issues 
In light of the current status of the ECJ case law on Article 71, it appears 
that for the purposes of establishing that international provisions on “parti-
cular matters” are to take precedence over Brussels Ia, such provisions cannot 
limit themselves to regulate in a complete and autonomous manner the pro-
cedural issue arisen in a given case. Rather, the said provisions must also, and 
above all, be deemed capable of providing a solution that, prima facie, may be 
regarded as consistent with the rationale underlying the Regulation as well as 
instrumental for the achievement of the objectives thereby pursued.
To put it differently, it is not sufficient that a given specialized convention 
governs – albeit in an exhaustive manner as regards the particular matter it is 
concerned with – the very same jurisdictional issues covered by the Regulation. 
As it arises from the above cited ECJ case law, the provisions on jurisdiction 
25 See paras 49-50 of the TNT judgment.
26 See para 42 of the Nipponkoa judgment.
27 See para 47 of the Nipponkoa judgment.
28 See paras 44-49 of the Nipponkoa judgment.
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or the recognition and enforcement of judgments laid down by international 
conventions in relation to particular matters are in fact allowed to display their 
effects only to the extent that their application in the case at stake does not 
compromise the fundamental principles underpinning the Brussels Ia system.
As pointed out by commentators, the ECJ’s approach briefly summarised 
above may be criticised under several aspects.29 However, what the present 
authors wish to focus on is the impact that such critical aspects are liable to 
have on the concrete interplay between the Regulation and the transport con-
ventions that may be reasonably deemed to fall within the scope of Article 71. 
In this perspective, the test elaborated by the Court shall hereunder be 
addressed with the aim of verifying, (i) first, whether or not it is apt, as such, 
to ensure that degree of predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction and 
therefore legal certainty for litigants, which – as remarked by the ECJ itself – 
should underlie judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters (below, 
§6); (ii) second, if – despite having been conceived with specific regard to cases 
in which the Regulation’s provisions were concurrent with those specifically 
laid down by the CMR convention – the test is eventually also capable of being 
applied in the very same terms in cases where the effects of Article 71 are to be 
assessed vis-à-vis other transport conventions (below, §7).
6. (CONTINUED) SOUND OPERATION OF THE INTERNAL MAR-
Ket V. LEGAL CERTAINTY: IS THERE ANY ROOM LEFT FOR THE 
CONCRETE OPERATION OF ARTICLE 71 OF THE REGULATION?
As regards the issue raised under (i) above, it bears recalling that the 
approach followed by the ECJ since the TNT case has been criticised by most 
29 See among others, M. Cremona, “The Internal Market and Private International 
Law Regimes: a comment on Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA 
Versicherung AG, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 May 2010”, 
(2014) EUI Working Paper, Law 8, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han-
dle/1814/31896/LAW_2014_08.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed on July 2015); Edi-
torial Comments, ‘The Union, the Member States and international agreements’ 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1; P.J. Kuijper, “The Changing Status of 
Private International Law Treaties of the Member States in Relation to Regulation 
44/2001: case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG” 
(2011) 38 Legal Issues of European Integration 89; C.E. Tuo (fn 13 above); M. At-
tal, “Droit international privé communautaire et conventions internationales: une 
délicate articulation”, Petites affiches, 30 novembre 2010 No 238; G. Rossolillo, 
“Convenzioni concluse dagli Stati membri e diritto processuale civile internazionale 
dell’Unione europea: interpretazione conforme o rispetto degli obblighi internazi-
onali?”, (2010) Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 305.  
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distinguished scholars in that it relies upon “a far-reaching teleological interpretati-
on” of Article 71, which results in doing “some violence” to the wording of Article 
7130, inasmuch as it gets close to an “interpretation contra legem”.31 
As the present authors have pointed out from the outset, the aim of Article 
71 unequivocally consists in setting out the conditions at which specialised 
conventions such as those on transports are allowed to display their effects in 
place of the Regulation. 
That this is the real objective behind the Article at hand and that such 
objective is not normatively subject to any of the conditions set out by the 
Court is further confirmed by the clear wording of Recital No. 35 of the Re-
gulation32. It follows that, as appropriately observed in literature, the EU 
legislator’s intention in drafting such a rule must have been that of “delimiting 
the scope of the Regulation by reference to pre-existing established international rules”.33 
And despite there being no doubt as to the legislature’s choice giving rise to the 
risk that the completeness of the single market judgments be compromised, 
it nonetheless amounts to “a political choice within the powers of the legislature”.34
However, in the TNT case the Court opted for an interpretation of Article 
71 which is hardly reconcilable with the EU legislator’s view.
As seen above, the ECJ’s position is that primary goal of Article 71 is to 
protect certain underlying principles of the Regulation, which the Court itself 
derived from some of the Recitals thereof. In so doing, the Court therefore 
showed to hold paramount the objectives of EU law35 as opposed to the objec-
tive, likewise to be found in the Recast Preamble, of preserving the application 
of sectoral rules such as those concerning international transports. 
In this regard, it must be observed that the objectives which, in the Court’s 
view, should drive the interpretation of Article 71 are not the only ones un-
derlying the Regulation. No doubt these are important goals, but the objective 
behind Article 71 is likewise to be found in the Regulation’s Preamble and 
the Court does not explain why this should have less importance.36 On the 
30 P.J. Kuijper (fn 29 above), at 99.
31 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 5.
32 See fn 4 above.
33 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 6.
34 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 6.
35 P. Mankowski (fn 8 above), note 4a.
36 As pointed out by Mankowski (fn 8 above), nothing in the Recitals specifically 
relates to Article 71 for the purposes of solving the possible conflict arising between 
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contrary, the Court itself recognizes that among the said principles those of 
certainty and predictability should also be included on exactly the same level.37
Moreover, to consider the interpretation of Article 71 as conditional upon 
the observance of the above mentioned principles implies not only a proper 
understanding thereof, but also the ability to interpret the specialised conven-
tion in the light of those principles, so as to assess the extent to which Article 
71 may be allowed to take effect. As a consequence, the approach followed by 
the ECJ results in Article 71 being made a conditional rule.38
Undoubtedly, the Court’s reasoning results in a clear rule such as Article 
71 being replaced with a conditional one. According to the Court, specialised 
conventions apply only insofar as they satisfy certain requisites, regardless of 
the latter being not even remotely envisaged by Article 71. This means that, in 
practice, rules on jurisdiction as laid down in a transport convention are allowed 
to operate in place of the Regulation only to the extent that they are as highly 
predictable, capable of facilitating the sound administration of justice and mini-
mising the risk of concurring proceedings as the Brussels provisions are.39 
But, as said, the question remains open as to how, on the one hand, the 
principles identified by the Court are to be put into play in each concrete case, 
and, on the other hand, the provisions laid down by the relevant specialised 
convention are to be effectively weighed against the said principles so as to 
establish whether or not Article 71 is enabled to operate.
Indeed, the Court’s choice seems to be in the sense that a one-size-fits-
all solution is unavailable and that, as a consequence, the concrete interplay 
between the Regulation and the relevant convention’s provisions is to be fo-
und out on a purely case-by-case basis.
A confirmation of the above may actually be drawn from the recent Kin-
tra case40, in which the Court reached the conclusion that Article 71 of the 
the principles underlying the Regulation and those underpinned by conventions on 
special matters, which means that if such a conflict actually arises it has to be dealt 
with on the basis of Article 71 rather than through any Recital whatsoever. 
37 A confirmation of the above may indeed be found in the said TNT and Nipponkoa 
judgments (see, respectively, para 49 and para 36) given that, as seen, the set of 
principles with which specialised conventions must be consistent in order to be giv-
en precedence over the Regulation expressly include «predictability as to the courts 
having jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty for litigants» (emphasis added). 
38 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 4.
39 P. Mankowski (fn 8 above), note 4a.
40 ECJ, judgment of 4 September 2014, case C-157/13, Nickel & Goeldner Spedition 
GmbH v. Kintra UAB, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2145.
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Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an action for the payment of 
carriage of goods services falling within the scope of application of the CMR 
may be brought in accordance with Article 31(1) thereof instead of with the 
corresponding heads of jurisdiction laid down by the Regulation. 
The Court first recalled the fundamental principles underlying the Regulation’s 
rules on jurisdiction as inferable from the relevant Recitals of the Preamble, and, 
second, carried out an analysis of the jurisdiction criteria laid down by Article 
31(1) CMR together with a confrontation thereof with the corresponding cri-
teria envisaged by the Regulation. Given that, in the Court’s view, the outcome 
of such analysis and confrontation is that the CMR rules on jurisdiction can be 
deemed as consistent with the principles of predictability and legal certainty 
as the Regulation’s corresponding provisions (as laid down by its Article 5(1), 
now Art. 7(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in case of a dispute falling within 
the scope of both the said instruments a Member State court may, pursuant to 
Article 71, apply the CMR rules in place of those of the Regulation.41
In light of the foregoing, it is however difficult to deny that the Court’s 
approach results in nothing other than Article 71 and the priority principle 
thereby enshrined being restricted42 – if not even rendered “meaningless and 
illusory”43 – and, as a consequence, the objectives of predictability and legal 
certainty pursued by the Regulation being unavoidably undermined.44
As observed in literature45, it is not the teleological approach followed by 
the Court which brings about the aforesaid drawbacks. Indeed, even though it 
41 The Court based itself on the consideration that Article 31 CMR entitles the claim-
ant to choose among as many alternative fora as the corresponding Regulation’s rule 
(namely, Article 5(1) Brussels I, now Article 7(1) Brussels Ia) substantially does 
(see paras 39-40 of the Kintra judgment). Nor has the circumstance that among 
the CMR fora stands one (namely, that of the country where the goods have been 
taken over by the carrier) which is not mirrored by the corresponding Regulation’s 
provision been considered as conflicting with the principles underlying the Regula-
tion. As stated by the Court in Rehder (case C-204/08, EU:C:2009:439), in fact, it 
is accepted in relation to contract for carriage that, in certain circumstances, the ap-
plicant may have the choice between the courts of the place of departure and those 
of the place of arrival (para 41 of the Kintra judgment).
42 C.E. Tuo (fn 13 above), at 24-25. In the same terms see also Mankowski (fn 8 
above), note 4a, who states that the ECJ restricts Article 71 for this rule is said that 
it cannot have a purpose that conflicts with these basic principles.
43 M. Attal (fn 29 above), at para 29.
44 For similar considerations see C.E. Tuo (fn 13 above), at 25-26.
45 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 6.
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is undeniable that teleology is, per se, likely to give rise to unpredictable inter-
pretative results, it is not on the basis of this sole reason that the said approach 
is to be disregarded. Rather, the Court’s approach is to be criticised in that it 
“has created exceptions to an extremely clear rule giving precedence to one objective over 
another on the basis of a teleology which is itself unclear”. Despite there being no do-
ubts as to the free circulation of civil and commercial judgments representing 
the ultimate goal of the Brussels system, it is nonetheless likewise undisputa-
ble that – as it clearly arises from the Regulation itself – such very aim cannot 
be achieved without ensuring legal certainty and predictability.
In this perspective, it is surely possible to maintain that in the Nipponkoa 
and Kintra cases the Court has, at least partially, mitigated the above said 
uncertainty in that it has provided national courts with some indications as to 
how to interpret the CMR.
Notably, in Nipponkoa the ECJ first clarified that, on the basis of TNT, 
Article 71 is to be understood as preventing domestic courts from interpre-
ting CMR in a sense “which fails to ensure under conditions at least as favourable as 
those provided for by [the Brussels Regulation], that the underlying objectives and 
principles of that regulation are observed”. Against this background, the ECJ then 
indicated what interpretation of Article 31(2) CMR would satisfy Article 71, 
i.e. what interpretation of the relevant provision laid down by the specialised 
convention come into play in the case at stake would “guarantee, in conditions 
at least as favourable as those laid down by Regulation No 44/2001, observance of the 
aim of minimising the risk of concurrent proceedings”. And it bears underlying that 
in Kintra the Court has gone even beyond such approach in that it directly 
carried out the analysis as to whether the relevant CMR’s provision could be 
deemed consistent with the Regulation’s principles and, as a consequence, 
applied in place of the corresponding provisions of the Regulation itself. In 
such latter decision the Court has, in other words, done what – as per the 
TNT ruling – the national court should have done: namely, it has verified 
if, in light of the circumstances featuring the concrete case, the international 
provision on jurisdiction come into play could be considered in line with the 
Regulation’s relevant principles and, as such, be applied in place of Brussels I 
pursuant to its Article 71.
But, in the present authors’ view, these recent developments of the ECJ’s 
case law fails to fully satisfy the need to overcome the uncertainty which, as 
seen above, is inherent in the very same test elaborated in TNT for the purpo-
ses of establishing whether or not, pursuant to Article 71, a given specialised 
convention is to take precedence over the Regulation. 
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The reason for this position is that, in principle, the test is to be put into play 
at the national level, i.e. by the domestic court which, in light of the concrete 
circumstances featuring the dispute, is called upon to establish whether the 
procedural issue it is faced with may be governed consistently with the re-
levant international provisions or has rather to be disciplined in accordance 
with the Regulation. It is, however, well-known that there is no uniformity 
as to the terms in which the Member States’ judicial authorities interpret the 
international transports conventions which are in force within their own legal 
system. And this lack of homogeneity is all the more evident if one has regards 
to the very field of transports, as the conventions dealing with such matter are 
generally given remarkably different meanings one from the other depending 
on the Member State courts before which proceedings are commenced.46
Therefore – unless the Court is specifically requested to clarify if, and to 
what extent, Article 71 allows a given international rule on jurisdiction to dis-
play its effects in place of the Regulation and the Court, as in the Kintra case, 
decides to directly indicate whether the rule at hand is applicable or not – no 
certainty can be said to exist as to the jurisdiction provisions laid down by 
international transport conventions which may be considered as capable of 
prevailing over the corresponding rules of the Regulation.
The persistence of the abovementioned uncertainty also results in the que-
stion as to the actual effectiveness of Article 71 of the Regulation remaining 
still open. Indeed, as Marise Cremona has put it, “the TNT decision has emptied 
the provision of all real legal force”.47
One might therefore have expected the EU legislator to take the occasion 
of the Brussels I Recast for revising Article 71 so as to adapt it to the ECJ case 
law. But, as seen above, the Article at hand has undergone no revision at all.
The fact that Article 71 of Brussels Ia perfectly mirrors Article 71 of Bru-
ssels I may indeed be regarded as a confirmation, on the one hand, that from 
the EU legislature’s viewpoint the codification of the Court’s jurisprudence 
would be of no avail to legal certainty and predictability being enhanced and, 
on the other hand, that the relationship between Brussels Ia and specialised 
conventions is nonetheless to be assessed on the basis of such jurisprudence, 
i.e. on a case-by-case basis, with a view to primarily ensuring that the principles 
identified by the Court as underlying the Regulation are not compromised by 
46 On this very issue see, among others, M. Lopez de Gonzalo, “Diritto uniforme dei 
trasporti e ‘forum shopping’”, (2010) Diritto marittimo 234.
47 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 13.
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the relevant provision of the specialised convention coming into play within 
the national dispute.
It therefore arises that while at the time of the TNT decision the EU 
legislature’s and the ECJ’s viewpoints as regards the aim behind Article 71 
turned out to be dramatically irreconcilable with one another, no such irrecon-
cilability may be said to exist anymore as of today.
To put it differently, one might argue that by maintaining the wording 
of Article 71 exactly as it was under Brussels I, the EU legislature has impli-
citly accepted that such rule is to be interpreted consistently with the Court’s 
approach, i.e. in such a way as to almost always give precedence to the Regu-
lation and, by so doing, to the objectives underlying therein as strictly instru-
mental into the establishment of the internal market. Of no importance to 
the contrary has, in other words, been considered the fact that this necessarily 
results in the objective, likewise to be still found in the Recast Preamble, of 
preserving the application of sectorial rules (such as those concerning interna-
tional transports) being almost completely disregarded.
If the above is the proper way of understanding the EU legislature’s cho-
ice not to amend Article 71, it may indeed be criticised for exactly the same 
reasons set out above as regards the Court’s approach. Namely, the broader 
application of specialised conventions such as those dealing with transports 
should have been favoured in that it “may be more important and conducive to legal 
certainty in commercial transactions than the preservation of internal homogeneity in the 
EU through privileging the Brussels Regulation”.48
7.  (CONTINUED) FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE IMPACT OF 
THE ECJ CASE LAW ON SOME TRANSPORT CONVENTIONS
Another issue that emerges from the analysis of the TNT test is (as said, §5 
above) the one pertaining to the applicability of the said test in case the inter-
national rules on jurisdiction or recognition and enforcement of judgments are 
contained in a transport convention other than the CMR.
Before delving into a discussion on this point, it seems appropriate to pre-
liminarily address the question as to which of the said conventions may be 
considered covered by Article 71. 
As seen above (see §1), the Article in question generally refers to the speci-
alised conventions to which the Member States were contracting party at the 
time of the entry into force of Regulation No 44/2001, i.e. on 1 March 2002. 
48 M. Cremona (fn 29 above), at 12.
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The Regulation does not provide for a list of the specialised conventions 
falling within the scope of application of Article 71. Neither has the Court 
so far been specifically requested to clarify which these conventions are. In 
Kintra, nonetheless, the ECJ expressly pointed out that the CMR was to be 
deemed covered by Article 71 insofar as the Member State of the court before 
which the main dispute was pending (namely, Lithuania) had acceded to such 
convention in 1993, i.e. before the entry into force of Brussels I.49
Therefore, a transport convention may be considered covered by Article 71 
if, and to the extent that, disputes falling within both the Regulation and the 
transport convention itself are connected with Member States which acceded 
to such convention before 1 March 2002. It follows that the provision at hand 
certainly applies to the international conventions referred to (albeit in a non-
exhaustive manner) in the Schlosser Report with a view to shedding light on 
the scope of application of Article 57 of the 1968 Brussels Convention.50
In doctrinal writings, however, the position has been held that, in addition 
to the conventions existing at the time when the Report was drawn up, the 
1999 Montreal Convention on international carriage by air51 and the 1999 
Arrest Convention52 may also be considered as specialised conventions falling 
within the scope of Article 71.53 That position rests on these two conventions 
being the successors of, respectively, the 1929 Warsaw Convention54 and the 
1952 Arrest Convention, i.e. of conventions to which the Member States were 
parties before the Brussels I Regulation’s entry into force.
If this position is accepted55, the question as to whether the two above-
mentioned conventions may be considered as prevailing over the Regulation 
in cases where a dispute falls within both the latter and, depending on the 
dispute’s subject-matter, the 1999 Montreal Convention or the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, should be answered by resorting to the TNT test.
49 See para 37 of the Kintra judgment.
50 P. Mankowski (fn 8 above), note 9.
51 Montreal Convention of 28 May 1999 for the unification of certain rules relating 
to international carriage by air.
52 International Convention on Arrest of ships, done at Geneva on 12 March 1999.
53 P. Mankowski (fn 8 above), note 9.
54 Warsaw Convention of 12 October 1929 for the unification of certain rules relating 
to international carriage by air.
55 This is however highly debatable as, if one considers the dates on which Member 
States became contracting parties, for instance, to the Montreal Convention, it 
plainly arises that such dates are all subsequent to the Brussels I’s entry into force.
Zbornik PFZ, 66, (2-3) 141-183 (2016) 161
As regards the Montreal Convention, the view has been expressed that the 
heads of jurisdiction laid down therein – namely, those envisaged by Article 
3356 – would take precedence over the Brussels Regulation. More particularly, 
it is the opinion of Peter Mankowski that “it would appear not only far-fetched 
but beyond any belief” if the heads of jurisdiction as contained in Art. 33 of the 
Montreal Convention “were alleged to be unpredictable”.57 
Indeed, if one sticks to the conditions under which, according to the TNT 
ruling, specialised conventions may be given precedence over the Regulation 
as per Article 71, the Montreal Convention should no doubt be considered as 
prevailing over Brussels Ia. It seems, in fact, hardly disputable that, if subject 
to TNT test, the jurisdiction criteria set forth by Article 33 of the Montreal 
Convention would be deemed consistent with the principles underlying the 
corresponding rules of the Regulation.
As seen above, according to the ECJ the conditions to be met by the spe-
cialised conventions’ rules on jurisdiction are that such rules ensure (i) high 
predictability as of the court having jurisdiction over the dispute, (ii) sound 
administration of justice and (iii) minimisation of the risk of parallel procee-
dings. Thus, the Regulation may be replaced by the corresponding rules on 
jurisdiction enshrined in a specialised convention only to the extent that such 
latter rules are deemed capable of ensuring at least the same results as those to 
which the Regulation would lead.
Hence, if indeed no doubts can be raised as to Article 33 of the Montreal 
Convention satisfying the requirements under (i) and (ii) above, one could 
wonder if the Article would likewise have been deemed apt at minimising the 
risk of parallel proceeding as per the requirement under (iii) above.
In this regard, however, it bears remembering that, as set out by the Court 
since the Tatry decision, the prevalence given to a specialised convention for the 
56 Which reads as follows: “1. An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the 
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either before the court of the domicile of 
the carrier or of its principal place of business, or where it has a place of business through which 
the contract has been made or before the court at the place of destination.2. In respect of dam-
age resulting from the death or injury of a passenger, an action may be brought before one of the 
courts mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of a State Party in which 
at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and 
to or from which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its 
own aircraft or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which 
that carrier conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or owned 
by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement”.
57 P. Mankowski (fn 8 above), note 4c.
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purposes of establishing jurisdiction does not preclude the same Regulation’s 
rules on lis pendens or the recognition and enforcement of judgments from 
eventually being put into play on a subsidiary basis. Thus, as appropriately 
remarked58, since the Brussels Ia provisions on lis pendens and the free mo-
vement of judgments appear perfectly consistent with both Article 33 of the 
Montreal Convention and its rationale, the said provisions shall undoubtedly 
also be deemed applicable in the case that, pursuant to Article 71, jurisdiction 
is established on the basis of one of the specialised criteria laid down by the 
Montreal Convention.
In light of the above, and at least having regard to the impact that the 
TNT test is likely to have on Article 33 of the 1999 Montreal Convention, the 
view taken by Professor Mankowski that “in practical effect” the ECJ’s approach 
might be “less subject to criticism than with regard to its theoretical and dogmatic am-
bition” as “practical results might differ less than policy statement” seems to 
be confirmed. So much so that, in his opinion, TNT “should be taken as a mere 
programmatic statement and not a truly operational device”.59
A different conclusion might however be reached if one comes to consider 
the interaction between the Regulation and the 1999 Arrest Convention’s ru-
les on recognition and the enforcement of judgments.
Unlike its predecessor (i.e., as said above, the 1952 Arrest Convention), 
the 1999 Convention lays down rules on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments (namely, those contained in Article 7(5)) determining the merits of 
the dispute in relation to which an arrest order has already been issued. The 
principle underlying such discipline is that of mutual recognition, the concrete 
operation of which is however subject to the conditions that (i) the defendant 
was given reasonable notice of the proceedings and a reasonable opportunity 
to present the case for the defence; (ii) recognition is not against (the reque-
sted State’s) public policy.
Given that the Recast Regulation has abolished the exequatur procedure60, 
the question arises as to what impact Article 71 of the Regulation would have 
58 S.M. Carbone, “Criteri di collegamento giurisdizionale e clausole arbitrali nel tra-
sporto aereo: le soluzioni della convenzione di Montreal del 1999”, (2000) Rivista 
di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 1, 5.
59 P. Mankowski (fn 8 above), note 4c.
60 See Article 39 Brussels Ia, which reads: “A judgment given in a Member State which is 
enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without any 
declaration of enforceability being required”. It bears underlining, however, that despite 
the Commission’s proposal to the contrary, the Recast has maintained the very 
same grounds for refusal of exequatur formerly envisaged by Brussels I as grounds for 
refusal of enforcement (see Article 46 Brussels Ia). 
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in case a judgment given by the court of a Member State which is also party 
to the 1999 Arrest Convention is requested to be recognised or enforced by 
the courts of another Member State which is likewise party to the same Con-
vention.
According to the ECJ’s approach, it seems that the question as to which one 
of the said instruments prevails over the other for the purposes of governing 
recognition or enforcement should be answered in favour of the Regulation. 
Indeed, should the opposite solution be endorsed, the principle of favor executi-
onis as enhanced by the new Regulation would be unacceptably compromised.
However, a solution of this type cannot be reached other than on the basis 
of a proper balancing of the specific interests of the parties involved in the 
dispute. Mutual enforcement of judgments rendered in accordance with the 
Arrest Convention implies that the debtor is in principle deprived of the po-
ssibility of precluding the foreign judgment from fully displaying its effects in 
the requested Member State.
Giving precedence to the Regulation over the 1999 Convention means, 
in other words, that no exequatur procedure is requested for such judgments 
and that, as a consequence, they are automatically enforceable throughout the 
EU judicial area subject only to the procedural rules existing in the requested 
Member State. No doubt that, according to Brussels Ia, the debtor is eventu-
ally entitled to invoke the grounds for refusal of enforcement envisaged by the 
Regulation itself as well as those provided to the same effect by the domestic 
rules of the requested State. But it seems hardly disputable that the exequatur 
procedure envisaged by the Arrest Convention would provide the debtor with 
an additional, if not even definitive, means to oppose the foreign judgment’s 
enforcement against him.
It is therefore submitted that, for a proper application of Article 71, the 
ECJ’s approach based on favor executionis should not be applied to the letter. 
Preference should not be aprioristically given to the EU rules on the sole basis 
of the principle of the primauté of EU law and the related major objectives. 
As appropriately pointed out, the latter principle bears relevance only to the 
extent that the rules conflicting with one another belong exclusively to the EU 
legal system, whereas it cannot display any effect in case of conflicts between 
EU rules and international law. Consequently, to pretend that the primauté 
principle is definitive for the purposes of giving precedence to EU rules is tan-
tamount to providing no valid justification at all for the Regulation to be given 
precedence over the corresponding international provisions.
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On the contrary, it seems preferable to stick to a teleological interpretation 
which, far from being exclusively focussed on the Regulation’s objectives (as 
indeed the ECJ has shown to conceive it in its case law on Article 71), also im-
plies a detailed consideration of the very objectives underlying the concurrent 
provisions laid down by the relevant specialised convention. This approach, 
which French scholars also refer to as “règle de l’efficacité maximale”, consists in 
comparing the interests that each set of concurrent rules aims at protecting 
with a view to giving precedence to those of them which are deemed most ca-
pable of satisfying such interests to the maximum possible extent.61 
Accordingly, Article 71 should function as a coordination clause, on the 
basis of which the relevant provisions of, respectively, the Regulation and the 
special convention should be compared with each other as regards their res-
pective underlying principles and rationale. As an outcome of such a confron-
tation, precedence should be given to the rules that, among those concurrently 
aimed at governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments, are found 
to be the most capable of achieving, up to the maximum possible extent, the 
objectives that both the Regulation and the special convention regard as fun-
damental. Indeed, as remarked in literature62, the only limit to such a coordi-
nation mechanism being fully put into play should be that of the respect of 
international commitments “not being affected”.
part ii
8. THE GROWING EU’S EXTERNAL COMPETENCES IN PIL AND 
transport matters
As remarked from the outset, the EU’s competences in the fields of both 
private international law and transports have grown significantly. 
This has resulted in a major change63 as regards the relationship between 
Brussels I and international conventions: Article 71 of the Recast Regulation 
expressly confirms the priority of the conventions “to which the Member States 
are parties and which, in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recog-
61 B. Dutoit, F. Majoros, “Le lacis des conflits de conventions et leurs solutions pos-
sibles”, (1984) Rev. crit. DIP 565, at 577.
62 S.M. Carbone, “Art. 2” in F. Pocar, T. Treves, S.M. Carbone, A. Giardina, R. Luz-
zatto, F. Mosconi, R. Clerici, Commentario del nuovo diritto internazionale privato, Pa-
doa, 1996, 8 at 12-14.
63 See P. Mankowski (fn 8), at 860.
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nition or enforcement of judgments”, but any further reference to the conventions 
to which Member States will be parties has been deleted.64 
The above mentioned change rests upon the shift of competence in favour 
of the European institutions, a shift which has progressively taken place not 
only in the field of private international law, but also in that of transport.
As was the case with competences in PIL matters, the external competence 
of the EU in the transport sector also traces its origin back to the so-called 
AETR doctrine65, according to which the EU alone is in a position to under-
take international obligations vis-à-vis third countries as far as EU rules have 
already been adopted that deal with (substantially) the same matter. 
At the internal level, transports fall within the shared competence between 
the EU and the Member States66, which is to be exercised consistently with 
the principle of subsidiarity. As a consequence, the EU and the Member States 
may both legislate and adopt legally binding acts in the area of transport. More 
precisely, the Union is entitled to act “only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level”.67 On the other hand, the Member 
States’ competence may be exercised to the limited extent that the Union has 
not yet exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its own. Therefore, where 
EU rules in the field of transport are adopted, Member States have the duty 
not only to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or 
resulting from the action taken by the institutions, but also to abstain from any 
measure capable of jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty; 
in addition, they are not allowed – independently from the EU institutions – to 
undertake obligations which might affect EU rules or alter their scope.68
Having said that, the exercise of the EU competence in the field of trans-
ports has never been easy notwithstanding a specific provision on the adoption 
of common rules applicable to international transports having always existed 
in the Treaties.69
64 See above para 1. 
65 See ECJ, judgment of 31 March 1971, case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA), 
[1971] ECR 263, paras 17 and 18.
66 See Article 4.2 lett. g TFEU.
67 See Article 5 TEU. 
68 ECJ, judgment of 12 February 2009, case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece, paras 17 
and 18.
69 See Article 91.1 lett. a) TFEU.
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The power to establish relationships with non-Member States and/or inter-
national organisations in the field of transport has been recognised by the ECJ 
since the above mentioned AETR case70, in which the theory of implied powers 
was expressed for the first time, and was later further developed through the 
Open skies case law.71 The Treaty of Lisbon has finally clarified, under Article 
3(2) TFEU, in the sense that the EU enjoys exclusive competence for the con-
clusion of an international agreement (i) when its conclusion is provided for in 
a legislative act of the Union, or (ii) is necessary to enable the Union to exer-
cise its internal competence (i.e. the so-called exclusive external competence of 
necessity, deriving from the above mentioned AETR and Open skies case law), 
or (iii) in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope 
(i.e. the so-called exclusive external competence for occupation, as stated in the 
AETR case law). 
Therefore, the EU may accede to international treaties in the field of trans-
ports on the grounds of the relevant TFEU rules on common European trans-
port policy provided by Articles 90-100, to be read in combination with Article 
218 TFEU (which lays down the rules on the negotiation and conclusion of 
international treaties). 
Today the EU is a relevant actor in the field of international transports and 
regularly cooperates with the most important international organizations72: 
suffice to recall that it has become a member of the OTIF, which has modi-
fied its statute in order to give regional organizations the chance to adhere to 
the conventions.73 Other international organizations – which have not made 
a similar change in their statute (as for example the International Maritime 
Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization) – recognize 
70 ECJ, judgment of 31 March 1971, case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) (fn. 65 
above). See S. Amadeo, Unione europea e treaty-making power, Milan, 2005, 90.
71 ECJ, judgment of 5 November 2002, case C-466/98, Commission v UK; ECJ, judg-
ment of 5 November 2002, case C-467/98, Commission v Denmark; ECJ, judgment 
of 5 November 2002, case C-468/98, Commission v Sweden; ECJ, judgment of 5 
November 2002, case C-469/98, Commission v Finland; ECJ, judgment of 5 No-
vember 2002, case C-471/98, Commission v Belgium; ECJ, judgment of 5 November 
2002, case C-472/98, Commission v Luxemburg; ECJ, judgment of 5 November 2002, 
case C-475/98, Commission v Austria; ECJ, judgment of 5 November 2002, case 
C-476/98, Commission v Germany.
72 See F. Munari – L. Schiano di Pepe, “Sovranità e trasporti: organizzazioni interna-
zionali e fonti normative indirette”, (2002) Diritto marittimo 107-160.
73 The accession is effective from 1 July 2011.
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however to the EU a privileged status, which the ECJ tends to protect74 by ask-
ing EU Member States – in strict observance of the duty of loyal cooperation 
– not to make any proposals capable of affecting EU law in the context of the 
work of such international organizations. 
9. GROWING COMPETENCES … GROWING INTERACTIONS: THE 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE RELATIONSHIPS 
between eu and international law
Understandably, the more the EU expands its competences, the more it 
is likely that EU law might interact with other sources of law adopted at the 
international level.75 Therefore, the need to connect EU law to – or, as the case 
may be, to disconnect it from – international law arises.76 
A very specific rule has been provided for the case of collision between EU 
law and international conventions concluded before 1 January 1958 (or, for 
acceding States, before the date of their accession). Under Article 351 TFEU, 
the rights and obligations arising from “ante-1958 conventions” “shall not be 
affected by the provisions of the Treaties”.77 As a result of EU membership, the 
74 Reference is made to ECJ, judgment of 12 December 2009, case C-45/07, Commis-
sion v. Greece, where the ECJ stated the principle under which, on the basis of the 
duty of loyal cooperation, a Member State is not allowed to make in the context of 
the works of the IMO a proposal which is capable to affect EU law.
75 See C. Legros, “L’intégration des conventions internationales dans le droit dérivé de 
l’Union européenne: l’exemple du droit des transports”, in Le droit entre tradition et 
modernité. Mélanges à la mémoire de Patrick Courbe, Paris, 2012, 367 ff.
76 On this topic, see A. Borras, “Diritto internazionale privato e comunitario e rappor-
ti con Stati terzi”, in P. Picone (ed. by), Diritto internazionale privato e diritto co-
munitario, Padova, 2004, 449-483; C. Briere, “Le droit de transports: terrain de 
prédilection des conflits de conventions internationales”, in Le droit entre tradition et 
modernité. Mélanges à la mémoire de Patrick Courbe, Paris, 2012, 69-74; C. Legros, (fn 
75 above); M. Pauknerova, “EU Regulations and international conventions – shifts 
in time”, in J. Forner Delaygua, C. Gonzalez Beilfuss, R. Vinas Farre (ed. by), Entre 
Bruselas y la Haya. Estudios sobre la unificacion internacional y regional del Derecho inter-
nacional privado. Liber amicorum Alegria Borras, Madrid, 2013, 671-684; C. Briere, Les 
conflits de conventions internationales en droit privé, Paris, 2001, 15.
77 The rule under Article 351 TFEU applies only to cases of multilateral agreements, 
not to inter-Member-States agreements, over which Union law takes precedence 
irrespectively of the fact that the latter predate accession to the EU or the treaties. 
On this point, see M. Cremona, “Disconnection clause in EC law and practice”, in 
C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (ed. by), Mixed agreements: The EU and its Member States in 
the World, Oxford, 2010, 160-186, at 161. For an application of this principle, see 
Commission v. Italy, case 10/61, where with regard to an agreement made between 
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Member State concerned is under a duty to take all appropriate steps to elimi-
nate the possible incompatibilities arising out of the international conventions 
to which such State is party and, as expressly stated by Article 351 TFEU, it 
would be helpful for the Member States to adopt and follow a common at-
titude in this regard.
The second possible way of interaction is that between EU law and inter-
national conventions to which the EU – in its quality of Regional Economic 
Integration Organization (REIO) – is a contracting party alongside with the 
Member States, i.e. the so-called “mixed agreements”.78
By virtue of Articles 216(2) and 218 TFEU, the conventions ratified by 
the EU are part of EU law. As a consequence, the Member States’ obligation 
to comply with such conventions arises not only directly from the agreement 
itself, but also as a matter of Union law. 
Despite the above mentioned provisions making it clear that Member 
States are bound to respect the international agreements entered into by the 
EU, the TFEU fails to clarify the relationship between such agreements and 
EU law. This gap is indeed all the more regrettable if one considers that – given 
the EU’s growing competences and the strict cooperation among the Member 
States in the specific field concerned – EU law is likely to evolve faster towards 
more modern solutions than those envisaged at the international level.
In these cases, a need therefore arises for EU law to be “disconnected” from 
the international conventions so as to be granted priority over them. As a 
consequence, when the EU enters into a mixed agreement, it frequently makes 
use of (i) the so-called “disconnection” clauses, through which EU law is given 
precedence over such agreement for the purposes of governing issues arisen 
within disputes of a purely intra-EU character, as well as of (ii) the “declara-
tion of competences”, through which the EU expressly defines its sphere of 
action in the specific field. 
A third conflict which is likely to arise is one between EU law and interna-
tional conventions to which all Member States or some of them are contract-
ing parties, but the EU is not. The reason for this situation lies, in most cases, 
Member States within the framework of GATT, the Court held that the Treaty 
took precedence.
78 As for PIL, the best examples are those of the Hague Conventions and, in particu-
lar, the Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations of 2007 and the 
2005 Hague Convention on choice of court agreements.  As for the transport sector, 
relevant examples are the Montreal Convention for the unification of certain rules 
for international carriage by air of 1999 as well as the COTIF, i.e. the Convention 
concerning international carriage by rail of 1999. 
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in the fact that those international treaties do not envisage the possibility for 
an actor other than a State to be a contracting party thereto.
Even when Member States conclude an international agreement indepen-
dently of the EU, their status as EU members remains unchanged and the 
primacy of Union law must as a consequence be complied with. The above is 
in derogation from the priority rule existing under international law, according 
to which the provisions laid down in a later treaty are to be given precedence 
over the corresponding ones contained in the same treaty’s previous version 
whenever a dispute arises involving States that are parties to both treaties.79
Given that, as said above, the competences of the EU are exponentially 
growing, it is plausible that such an international convention, far from being 
deemed capable of affecting the EU’s existing law and/or action in a specific 
field in some way, is rather regarded as apt at giving “a valuable contribution” 
in the pursuit of the EU’s objectives. 
In such cases, a need arises for the EU to establish some “connections” with 
the international law rules, but the Treaties are silent on how such connections 
are to be established. Two methods have therefore been resorted to at the EU 
level for the purpose of satisfying the said need: the first one is to authorise or 
recommend Member States to ratify the convention in the interest of the EU80 
and the second is to implement parallel EU legislation.
In the following paragraphs, the specific techniques whereby the EU rules 
are connected to – or, as the case may be, disconnected from – international 
conventions on transport matters will be explored with a view to assessing 
their impact on the sphere of application of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
10. THE MECHANISMS DESIGNED TO “DISCONNECT” EU LAW 
FROM INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTS CONVENTIONS 
The so-called “disconnection clauses”81 represent a crucial device for the 
regulation of the relationship between EU and international law and is usually 
79 By virtue of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. On 
this point, see M. Cremona (fn 76 above), at 171.
80 See C. Cellerino, Soggettività internazionale e azione esterna dell’Unione europea, Rome, 
2015, 288 ff. 
81 The notion “disconnection clause” is used by the EU institutions. However, other 
possible terms may be used. See P.J. Martin Rodriguez, Flexibilidad y tratados in-
ternacionales, Madrid, 2003, at 139 who quotes as examples the terms: exception, 
derogation, waiver, restriction, limitation, suspension, extension, reservation, claw-
back clause, opt in and opt out. On disconnection clauses, see M. Cremona (fn 77 
above). 
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to be found in international agreements to which the EU itself is a contracting 
party.  
They aim at protecting the autonomy of the EU’s legal order by providing 
that as between the EU Member State parties to the agreement the relevant 
provisions of Union law are to be applied instead of those contained in the 
international agreement at stake.82
In this light, disconnection clauses are a sort of conflict-of-laws rules: in-
deed, the effect of a disconnection clause being inserted in an international 
treaty is that EU rules (instead of those laid down by the international treaty 
itself) apply in the Member States’ mutual relations, irrespective of whether 
such States are all contracting parties to the convention or not. As a conse-
quence, the convention’s scope of application is limited to the relationships 
between a contracting EU Member State and a non-EU contracting State as 
well as to all the relationships between non-EU contracting States.
These clauses are particularly useful in cases where not all Member States 
have ratified the international convention, since – by granting priority to EU 
law – they pursue uniformity within the EU in addition to protecting the in-
terests of Member States.
The legal basis for the clauses at hand is primarily to be found in Article 41 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, pursuant to which two 
or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty are authorised to conclude an 
agreement (the so called inter se agreement) to modify the treaty as between 
themselves alone.83 Moreover, given their underlying purpose of protecting the 
82 See M. Cremona (fn 77 above), at 161. As for the protection of the interests of the 
EU, the so called “dimension promotionnelle” of the clauses, see P.J. Martin Rodri-
guez (fn 81 above), at 138 and 113. For a further definition, see the Report on the 
consequences of the so-called “disconnection clause” in international law in general 
and for Council of Europe Conventions, containing such a clause, in particular, 
which states that the term “disconnection clause” is commonly used to refer to a 
provision in a multilateral treaty allowing certain parties to the treaty not to apply 
the treaty in full or in part in their mutual relations, while other parties remain free 
to invoke the treaty fully in their relations with these parties (para 10). 
83 More precisely, under Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Trea-
ties, this is subject to: (a) The possibility of such a modification is provided for by 
the treaty; or (b) The modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and: 
(i) Does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the 
treaty or the performance of their obligations; (ii) Does not relate to a provision, 
derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph l(a) 
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autonomy of the EU’s legal order, such clauses are also grounded in the duty of 
loyal cooperation as laid down by Article 4(3) TFEU: by virtue of the discon-
nection clauses, EU Member States are entitled to put aside international law 
obligations and to apply EU law in their mutual relationships.84 
As said above, disconnection clauses are usually contained in international 
agreements to which the EU is a contracting party, but they may also be in-
cluded in EU instruments85 – as it happens for Article 71 Brussels Ia – for the 
purposes of establishing their interrelation with other rules, of either an inter-
national or EU origin, concurrently governing the same subject-matter.
The very “first generation” disconnection clauses were worded in clear-cut 
terms86 and, as a consequence, Member States had no other choice but to ap-
ply EC/EU law instead of the concurring international rules. 
the treaty otherwise provides, the parties in question shall notify the other parties 
of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification to the treaty 
for which it provides.
84 See also, C. Briere (fn 76 above), at 71.  
85 For some examples of disconnection clauses contained in EU instruments, apart 
from art. 71 of the Bruxelles I Recast Regulation, see also Articles 59-63 of Regula-
tion No. 2201/2003 concerning the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibil-
ity (Brussels IIa Regulation), Article 69 of Regulation No. 4/2009 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in mat-
ters relating to maintenance obligations, Article 75 of Regulation No. 650/2012 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and accept-
ance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of successions and on 
the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, Article 25 of Regulation No. 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation) and 
in Article 28 of Regulation No. 864/2008 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II Regulation). 
86 The practice of disconnection clauses aimed at protecting the EC/EU legal order 
started in 1988 with the first treaty adopted under the aegis of the Council of 
Europe and of the Organisation for economic cooperation and development in Eu-
rope, i.e. the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters (Stras-
bourg 25 January 1988, ETS No. 27). More precisely, Article 27.2 of that Treaty 
states: “Notwithstanding the rules of the present Convention, those Parties which are mem-
bers of the European Economic Community shall apply in their mutual relations the common 
rules in force in that Community”. Similar wording is used in the disconnection clause 
provided by the European Convention on trans frontier television 1989, ETS No. 
132, as amended by Protocol ETS No. 171, stating that “In their mutual relations, 
Parties which are members of the European Community shall apply Community rules and 
shall not therefore apply the rules arising from this Convention except in so far as there is no 
Community rule governing the particular subject concerned”.
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On the contrary, “modern” disconnection clauses are frequently (and un-
fortunately) worded in a more nuanced way87, as they do not prohibit Member 
States from applying the convention, but merely state that EU law is to be 
given prevalence in so far as EU rules exist on the subject matter of the conven-
tion and are applicable to the case at stake.88
Such clauses are clearly more flexible: they are grounded in notions that, like 
those of “subject matter” and “case at stake”, need to be interpreted taking into 
account that EU law is evolving and developing over time. This is particularly 
regrettable if one considers that disconnection clauses operate automatically, i.e. 
without the necessity to be specifically invoked and irrespectively of the exist-
ence of a real conflict between a rule of the convention and one of EU law. 
With the aim of better clarifying the mechanism of disconnection, the EU 
has eventually further developed it by providing a declaration whereby infor-
mation is offered as to the subjects covered by such clauses as well as to the 
distribution of competences between EU and Member States.89
However, in practice, the combined use of these two devices – i.e. the dis-
connection clause and the declaration of competences – does not always clarify 
the interaction between EU and international law, as the case of rail transport 
clearly demonstrates.
At the international level, rail transport is traditionally regulated by the In-
tergovernmental Organisation for the International Transport by Rail (the so-
called OTIF), created by the Berne Convention of 9 May 1980 (the so-called 
COTIF). The 1999 Vilnius Protocol was the last to amend the Convention, 
which is now called COTIF 1999 and which entered into force on 1 July 2006. 
87 See M. Cremona (fn 77 above), at 171.
88 For an example of a recent disconnection clause, see Article 27.1 of the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005, CETS No. 196, Article 
26.3, stating that “Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mu-
tual relations, apply Community and European rules in so far as there are Community and 
European rules governing the particular subject concerned and applicable to the specific case, 
without prejudice to the object and purpose of the present Convention and without prejudice to 
its full application with other parties”. 
89 As pointed out by M. Cremona (fn 77 above), at 173, the declaration of compe-
tence is designed for third States, to indicate who has primary responsibility for 
implementation of the convention based on competence. Whilst the disconnection 
clause indicated to the other contracting parties that the agreement is one in which 
there is Union competence and Union rules apply, but does not give any indica-
tion of the scope and nature of the EU competence, the declaration clarified these 
aspects vis-à-vis third States. 
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COTIF 1999 provides rules regarding the functioning of the organisation it-
self and, in its appendices, all the conventions of international uniform law 
regarding rail transport90 adopted under the aegis of the OTIF, among which 
particularly relevant are the CIV and the CIM. 
In the light of the growing competence of the EU in the rail sector, as 
a result of a very difficult negotiation the OTIF has decided to amend the 
original Berne Convention by introducing a specific rule for the accession of 
REIO.91 Owing to this amendment, the EU has acquired the membership of 
the organization and has also become a contracting party to the Convention 
and its appendices.
Given the EU’s signature and ratification and by virtue of Article 216 TFEU, 
COTIF 1999 is now binding on all EU member States, including those (as 
Italy, for example), which have neither signed nor ratified it. In other words, 
the duty to comply with the international Convention is binding on the EU 
Member States not (only) directly – by virtue of their ratification, if any – but 
(also) indirectly, by means of the signature and ratification thereof by the EU. 
It is however submitted that some clarification on this “indirect” effect of 
the EU’s accession to a treaty – in particular vis-à-vis those Member States 
which are not contracting party thereto – should perhaps be provided for the 
benefit of the rail transport operators: indeed, a common “European” approach 
towards this issue would be very welcome. 
Noteworthy is, moreover, the way in which the EU acceded to COTIF 1999, 
i.e. by means of combined use of the disconnection clause included in the agree-
ment between the EU and the OTIF92 and the declaration of competences.
90 More precisely: (i) Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of International Car-
riage of Passengers by Rail (CIV - Appendix A to the Convention); (ii) Uniform 
Rules Concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM 
- Appendix B to the Convention); (iii) Regulation concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID - Appendix C to the Convention); (iv) 
Uniform Rules concerning Contracts of Use of Vehicles in International Rail Traf-
fic (CUV - Appendix D to the Convention); (v) Uniform Rules concerning the 
Contract of Use of Infrastructure in International Rail Traffic (CUI - Appendix E to 
the Convention); (vi) Uniform Rules concerning the Validation of Technical Stand-
ards and the Adoption of Uniform Technical Prescriptions applicable to Railway 
Material intended to be used in International Traffic (APTU - Appendix F to the 
Convention); (vii) Uniform Rules concerning the Technical Admission of Railway 
Material used in International Traffic (ATMF - Appendix G to the Convention).
91 Reference is made to Article 38 of the COTIF 1999.
92 Reference is made to the Agreement published in OJ L 51 of 23 February 2013, p. 2. 
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More precisely, Article 2 of that Agreement provides that the Union rules 
shall be applied in mutual relations among EU Member States instead of the 
rules laid down by the Convention, except in case there is no Union rule go-
verning the particular subject concerned.93 
The declaration of competence – i.e. a separate document not enclosed with 
the agreement – should have clarified as well as possible where the EU rules 
are capable of being affected by the rules of COTIF 1999 and those of the 
conventions enclosed therewith. However, the declaration is not particularly 
useful to this end. 
First of all, the declaration does not add anything to the general principles 
enshrined in the Treaties on the division of competences between Member 
States and EU after the Lisbon Treaty. More precisely, the declaration con-
firms that (i) whilst the EU competence in the field of rail transport is exclu-
sive as regards all rail transport matters governed by Union rules which are 
at risk of being affected or altered in their scope by the 1999 COTIF system, 
(ii) all matters which, despite being covered by Union rules, are nonethele-
ss not affected by the 1999 COTIF system, fall within a shared competence 
between the EU and the Member States. Furthermore, given the continuous 
development of EU law, the declaration is expressly subject to possible amen-
dments by the EU. 
Moreover, the declaration is far from clear. 
Even if a list of Union instruments in force at the time of its adoption is 
provided, it is expressly stated that the scope of EU competence in the field as 
stake shall be assessed “in relation to the specific provisions of each text, especially the 
extent to which these provision establish common rules”. 
With specific reference to the issues related to jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion or enforcement of judgments, i.e. to the relationship between the COTIF 
1999 system and the Brussels Ia Regulation, it is noted that the list of Union 
instruments does not even mention the “Brussels I system”, despite the latter 
clearly falling within the Union instruments capable of being “affected” by the 
COTIF 1999 system and, in particular, by the rules on jurisdiction envisaged 
93 More precisely, Article 2 reads as follows: “Without prejudice to the object and the pur-
pose of the Convention to promote, improve and facilitate international traffic by rail and 
without prejudice to its full application with respect to other Parties to the Convention, in 
their mutual relations, Parties to the Convention which are Member States of the Union shall 
apply Union rules and shall therefore not apply the rules arising from that Convention except 
in so far as there is no Union rule governing the particular subject concerned”.
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by the CIV and the CIM. This undoubtedly results in that very issue being 
far from clear from the standpoint of both the COTIF 1999 and Brussels I 
systems.
Indeed, it seems that the special rules on jurisdiction provided by the CIV 
and the CIM should be granted priority over the Brussels Ia Regulation. Still, 
it is not clear whether this priority is to be grounded upon either Article 71 
or Article 67 of the Regulation. In favour of this latter solution stands in fact 
the consideration that – owing to the EU having ratified it – the 1999 COTIF 
system has become part of the EU acquis and, as such, should be given prece-
dence over the Regulation as per the above mentioned provision of Article 67.
11. THE TECHNIQUES AIMED AT “CONNECTING” EU LAW TO IN-
ternational treaties on transport matters 
Interpretative problems also arise when the EU tries to establish “connec-
tions” with international treaties to which only States (and not REIO) are al-
lowed to accede. In the absence of specific rules, two techniques are followed 
by the EU: (i) the authorisation to ratify an international treaty94 or (ii) the 
adoption of parallel EU legislation. 
The solution of authorisation to ratify has been resorted to, for example, in 
the case of the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker 
Oil Pollution Damage, which – in addition to uniform substantial rules on civil 
liability – also provides rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments. More particularly, the Convention’s rules on jurisdiction 
have been considered more suitable than those of Brussels I to strengthen the 
international regime of ship-owners liability for pollution damage as well as to 
require compulsory liability insurance. Indeed, whilst under Brussels I a claim 
for compensation for pollution damage against the ship-owner or its insurer 
may be filed, at the plaintiff’s choice, before several alternative fora (apart from 
the domicile of the ship-owner, it is possible to start a proceeding before the 
courts of the State where the harmful event took place and, in addition, it is 
94 Beside authorization to ratify, in theory, the EU might opt for a (an even) softer 
instrument: the recommendation to open negotiations towards the Member States. 
However, the instrument of authorization has proved not to be particularly suc-
cessful, since in all the above mentioned three cases not all EU Member States have 
ratified the international convention. Therefore, the risk for the recommendation 
to be ignored is even higher than the one with the authorization. See P. Mankowski 
(fn 8), art. 71, at 862.
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possible for the injured party to sue the insurer in the courts of the Member 
State of its domicile), Article 9 of the Bunker Oil Convention only envisages 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the coastal State. 
Member States have, therefore, been authorized to ratify the Convention, 
subject to the condition that Member States would continue to apply the 
Brussels I Regulation (and now its Recast) with regard to the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments among themselves.95
The same path has also been followed in the case of the 1996 HNS Conven-
tion (International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
connection with the carriage of hazardous and noxious substances by sea). 
As it happened with the Bunkers Convention, such treaty does not provide 
for the ratification thereof by the EU. However, since ratification by Member 
States has been recognised as highly desirable, they have been authorised to 
ratify the HNS Convention subject to a reservation worded in terms identical 
to those of the Bunkers Convention.96
The second technique applied in order to establish some form of “connec-
tion” between EU law and international treaties to which EU is not allowed to 
accede is the adoption of parallel EU legislation. 
In the field of transport, the abovementioned interaction is emerging par-
ticularly as regards the transport of persons (i.e. passengers and their luggage), 
but it is possible (rectius likely) that the EU will soon expand this technique so 
as to cover also carriage of goods.97
As far as transport of passengers is concerned, the EU has followed a “uni-
modal” approach, adopting specific rules on the duties and rights of passengers 
95 See Article 2 of the Council Decision authorizing the Member States, in the inter-
est of the Community, to sign, ratify or accede to the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 (the Bunkers Convention) 
(2002/762/EC) of 19 September 2002. As pointed out by P. Mankowski, originally 
a reservation had been considered in favour of applying the Brussels I Regulation 
if the defendant was domiciled in a Member State and the damage occurred in a 
Member State (see COM (2001) 675 final p. 8), but the Parliament opposed it and 
finally it was dismissed.
96 2002/971/EC: Council Decision of 18 November 2002 authorizing the Member 
States, in the interest of the Community, to ratify or accede to the International 
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996 (the HNS Conven-
tion), 2002 OJ L337.
97 See C. Legros (fn 75 above), at 384, who believes that for the regulation of trans-
port contracts, the EU level is appropriate more with reference to contracts regard-
ing the transport of persons, than those regarding the transport of goods. 
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as well as on the liabilities of carriers, with reference to each single mode of 
transport. Such rules often result in the international treaties’ provisions being 
included within the relevant EU secondary legislation.98 
Reference is made – in particular – to (i) Regulation No 2027/199799 (as 
amended by the Regulation 889/2002100) for air transport, (ii) Regulation No 
1371/2007101 for rail transport, and to (iii) the Regulation No 392/2009102 for 
maritime transport, which makes reference to the Athens convention.103 
The incorporation of international uniform treaties in the field of air, rail 
and maritime transport has not proven to be an easy task, as such treaties con-
tain both substantive rules on the transport contracts and PIL rules (mainly 
rules on jurisdiction, but sometimes also rules on recognition and enforce-
ment).
In the field of air transport, Regulation No 2027/1997 was first to imple-
ment the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and then those of the Mon-
treal Convention related to the liability of the air carrier. When the Regulation 
was adopted, the rules on jurisdiction provided by the international treaty 
clearly prevailed over the 1968 Brussels Convention, as at that time no specific 
actions in the field of PIL had yet been taken by the European Community. 
However, in amending the original regime, Regulation No 889/2002 failed to 
take into account the evolution which occurred in the meantime in that very 
field. 
98 Such a technique – followed for air, rail and maritime transport – has not been fol-
lowed in the case of transport by bus and coach, where the EU has adopted Regu-
lation (EU) No. 181/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
February 2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport and 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004, 2011 OJ L55, which does not make any 
reference to international treaties. 
99 Regulation (EC) No. 2027/97 of the Council of 9 October 1997 on air carrier li-
ability of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air, 1997 OJ L285. 
100 Regulation (EC) No. 889/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 May 2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2027/97 on air carrier liabil-
ity in the event of accidents, 2002 OJ L140.
101 Regulation (EC) No. 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, 2007 OJ L315.
102 Regulation (EC) No. 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of acci-
dents, 2009 OJ L131.
103 Athens Convention of 13 December 1974 relating to the Carriage of Passengers 
and their Luggage by Sea.
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Similarly, Regulation No 1371/2007 incorporates only some of the sub-
stantial uniform rules of the CIV104, whilst it fails to include the rule on juris-
diction provided by Article 57 of the CIV. This was done notwithstanding the 
fact that, at the time of the adoption of such Regulation, there was little doubt 
as to the EU powers and competences in the field of PIL both at the internal 
and international level. 
Even if, in practical terms, no significant differences arise from the applica-
tion of the rules on jurisdiction of the Brussels system as opposed to those of 
either the Montreal Convention or the CIV, the issue remains still open. 
As of today, the most sophisticated solution envisaged by the EU as regards 
the interaction of its rules with international treaties on transports matters is 
the one provided by Regulation No 392/2009.
This Regulation fully incorporated the Athens Convention on the carriage 
of passengers and their luggage by sea and expressly tackled the problem of 
the relationship of the Athens Convention rules with those of the Brussels 
system. More particularly, the Regulation states that the provisions regard-
ing jurisdiction105 and the recognition and enforcement of judgments106 of the 
Athens Convention “fall within the exclusive competence of the Community in so far 
as those Articles affect the rules established by Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters” (see Recital 11).
Even if it is of course to be appreciated that the most recent EU instru-
ments on transport matters expressly consider their possible interaction with 
international treaties of uniform law, a coordination between the “European-
ized” Athens convention and the Brussels system may still give rise to some 
uncertainty. 
As regards recognition and enforcement, the new Brussels Ia rules seem 
more lenient than the corresponding regime of the Athens Convention and, as 
such, capable of prevailing over it.107 As regards jurisdiction – given the incor-
104 The purpose of this incorporation is expressed in clear terms under recital 14, stat-
ing that “It is desirable that this Regulation create a system of compensation for passengers in 
the case of delay which is linked to the liability of the railway undertaking, on the same basis 
as the international system provided by the COTIF and in particular appendix CIV thereto 
relating to passengers’ rights”.
105 Art. 17 of the Athens Convention.
106 Art. 17-bis of the Athens Convention. 
107 It seems reasonable to extend the above comment – made by S. Gahlen, “Jurisdic-
tion, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments under the 1974 PAL for Pas-
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poration of the Regulation and also the ratification of the Athens Convention 
by the EU – the lex specialis rule should apply, that is to say that the rules of 
the Athens Convention should prevail. However, apart from the principles 
stated by the ECJ in its case law on Article 71 Brussels I, no further guidance 
is provided. 
Beside the existing difficulties in interpreting the legislative framework with 
specific reference to the PIL issues, the sui generis interaction deriving from the 
(partial) incorporation of transport international treaties within EU instru-
ments has some relevant positive effects, which are briefly referred to below. 
First of all, the incorporation is made independently of whether the Con-
vention itself has been ratified or not by all Member States. This means that 
the Member States which have not ratified it eventually find themselves bound 
by the international Convention as a consequence of the latter having been in-
corporated in the Regulation.
Italy, for example, has not ratified the new COTIF 1999, but it is however 
bound to respect it and its appendices as a consequence of the ratification of 
the Convention by the EU as well as of the incorporation of some rules of the 
CIV within Regulation No 1371/2007. 
Furthermore, the incorporation technique also enables the EU legislature 
to “adjust” the rules of international conventions taking into consideration 
new aspects or specific needs arisen in the sector at stake as well as particular 
situations featuring the EU context.
The EU legislature usually extends the scope of application of the interna-
tional uniform rules by making them applicable to merely internal transport, 
as well (and therefore taking the international character out of them).108 This 
turns out to be particularly useful from a purely practical viewpoint, as trans-
port operators are allowed to deal with a unitary regime – such as the regime 
on the rights and duties of passengers as well as that on the liability of the 
carrier – regardless of the service provided having a cross-border or a merely 
national character. 
A further positive consequence deriving from the considered interaction is 
that the international convention – by virtue of its inclusion in the EU instru-
ments – will be subject to the interpretation of the ECJ. And it is not to be 
senger Claims, the 2002 Protocol and the EU Regulation 329/2009”, (2014) Eur. 
Transport Law 13, at 17 – with regard to the Brussels I Regulation a fortiori to the 
Brussels Ia Regulation. 
108 On this point see C. Legros (fn 75 above), at 380. 
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excluded that the interpretation of the EU regulation “modelled” on the inter-
national treaty may, in the end, result in the uniformity of the international 
treaty’s interpretation being really achieved at the national level, as well.
12. ConClusions
In light of all the foregoing considerations, major uncertainties exist as to 
the terms in which Regulation Brussels Ia is meant to interrelate with interna-
tional conventions on transport matters. This conclusion is indeed all the more 
regrettable considering that issues of both PIL and transports are commonly 
addressed by the EU itself as crucial for the sound operation of the internal 
market to be fully achieved.
As observed in Part I, the test elaborated by the ECJ for the purposes of 
establishing when, and to what extent, international transport conventions 
may be given precedence over Brussels Ia has resulted in Article 71’s scope of 
application being remarkably restricted if not even emptied of all real force. In-
deed, to stick to such test actually means that the concrete interplay between 
Brussels Ia and the relevant transport convention is to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, which puts the same Regulation’s objectives of legal certainty 
and predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction at risk of being seriously 
undermined. 
Therefore, one could reasonably wonder if the approach so far developed 
by the ECJ is really suitable for achieving the major goal which the Brussels 
I system as a whole is instrumental for. As acknowledged by the Court itself, 
in fact, among the Regulation’s principles which should drive the concrete 
coordination between Brussels Ia and the relevant specialised conventions are 
not only “free movement of judgments, sound administration of justice, minimisation 
of the risk of concurrent proceedings and mutual trust in the administration of justice”, 
but also “predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty 
for litigants”.
It is the present authors’ opinion that legal certainty and predictability 
will indeed be enhanced if the ECJ reviewed its test so as to have the relevant 
convention at stake weighed against the very whole of the objectives underly-
ing the Regulation, included that behind Article 71 (i.e. the respect of Member 
States’ international commitments). To this end, it is suggested that the Court 
avail itself of the abovementioned “règle de l’efficacité maximale”, whereby, as 
seen, the rules that are to be given prevalence pursuant to Article 71 are those 
which, on the basis of a thorough comparison of the objectives respectively 
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pursued by the Regulation and the transport convention, are found to be most 
suitable to satisfy, to the maximum possible extent, the interests protected by 
both instruments.
Neither is the picture clearer if one comes to consider the interrelations be-
tween Brussels Ia and transport conventions falling outside the scope of Article 
71. That aside, as said above, uncertainty exists also as to the exact identifica-
tion of the specialised conventions covered by that rule, the conclusion to be 
drawn from Part II above is that the main problem in dealing with interactions 
between EU law and international transport conventions consists in the EU 
being in some way still “reluctant” to exercise its external competences with 
regard to PIL issues related to transport.
This seems paradoxical if one considers that (i) since ECJ Opinion 1/03, 
doubts cannot longer be raised about the exclusive character of the EU’s exter-
nal competence in PIL matters; (ii) transports play a crucial role for the sound 
operation of the internal market, and (iii) as far as the transport of persons 
is concerned, protection of passengers is strictly connected with protection of 
consumers, a field in which the EU has acted widely thus acquiring a broad 
power of action at the international level, as well.109
It is therefore submitted that the time has come for a more “courageous” 
and open approach of the EU to PIL issues related to transport. 
In particular, the path followed in the case of the Athens Convention seems 
the correct one: the combination of the sui generis interaction between EU and 
international law by way of incorporating the rules of the international treaties 
within an EU instrument together with the EU’s accession to the international 
treaties themselves seems to be the best way for the EU to handle the con-
nections and disconnections issues regarding the international instrument at 
stake. In this light, the partial incorporation of the international treaties’ sub-
stantial rules on transport – incorporation which, as seen above, occurred in 
the case of Regulations No 1371/2007 and No 2027/1997 – should be avoided 
in the future. 
109 On the other side, given the fact that the protection of passengers is close to the 
protection of consumers, with which it has in common the protection of weaker 
parties and where – despite it is still a shared competence – the EU has acted widely 
and, therefore, for the principle of pre-emption it might be even considered a topic 
of exclusive competence of the EU, it might be argued that it is for the EU to adopt 
rules in this field. See Ph. Delebeque, “Droit de transports vs. Droit de la consum-
mation”, (2010) RD transports. 
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Furthermore, when the EU accedes to an international treaty, appropri-
ate guidance should be provided in order to put practitioners in a position 
to clearly understand which provisions prevail over the others (as well as the 
mechanism whereby such a priority is granted). 
The disconnection clause is, perhaps, the most suitable instrument for this 
purpose, but a clear-cut wording still needs to be elaborated with the aim of 
avoiding further uncertainties. To this end, a soft law instrument (such as a 
Commission’s communication) may even be deemed sufficient. 
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Sažetak
Chiara e. tuo *
laura Carpaneto **
POVEZNICE I ISKLJUČENJA IZMEĀU BRISELSKE UREDBE IA I 
MEĀUNARODNIH KONVENCIJA O PRIJEVOZU
Unatoč ključnoj ulozi prometa u razvoju unutarnjeg tržišta nova Uredba EU-a br. 
1215/2012 (“Briselska uredba Ia”) ne pojašnjava odnos između vlastitih pravila i 
odredaba o nadležnosti ili priznavanju i izvršenju presuda propisanih međunarodnim 
konvencijama u sektoru prijevoza. Sud Europske unije zapravo je utvrdio test za određivanje 
uvjeta prema kojima se – u skladu s člankom 71. – rješavaju pitanja nadležnosti ili 
priznavanja i izvršavanja presuda u skladu s nekom međunarodnom konvencijom umjesto 
s dotičnom Uredbom. Međutim, taj se test (i) ne čini pogodnim kao takav za osiguravanje 
potrebne razine predvidivosti u određivanju nadležnog suda te time pravne sigurnosti za 
stranke u postupku, što je – kako je sam Sud EU-a predvidio – osnova za pravosudnu 
suradnju u građanskim i trgovačkim stvarima; (ii) zamišljen je imajući u vidu slučajeve u 
kojima pitanja nadležnosti ili priznavanja i izvršenja presuda ulaze u područje primjene i 
Uredbe i konvencije CMR. S druge strane, nije jasno kako takozvane “isključujuće odredbe” 
– koje gotovo beziznimno nalazimo u aktima kojima je EU pristupio raznim konvencijama 
o prijevozu i čija je svrha davanje prednosti pravu EU-a – trebaju funkcionirati u praksi u 
odnosu na Briselsku uredbu Ia. Uzimajući u obzir navedena otvorena pitanja, ciljevi ovoga 
rada su (i) utvrditi hoće li se Sud EU-a, pri utvrđivanju uvjeta pod kojima se Uredba 
treba povezati s konvencijama o prijevozu, držati dosadašnjeg pristupa ili ga revidirati 
kako bi ga uskladio s načelima pravne sigurnosti i predvidljivosti vezano uz određivanje 
nadležnog suda; (ii) pojasniti uvjete prema kojima se za određenu konvenciju o prijevozu 
smatra da ulazi u okvir članka 71. Uredbe; (iii) ispitati najbolji pristup odnosu između 
Uredbe i konvencija o prijevozu koje nisu obuhvaćene člankom 71.; (iv) ispitati je li taj 
odnos uređen određenom odredbom (isključujućom odredbom); (v) potražiti interpretativno 
rješenje koje omogućava, čak i ako ne postoji konkretna odredba, utvrđivanje s razumnom 
razinom sigurnosti koje se odredbe – između odredbi Briselske konvencije Ia i onih određene 
konvencije o prijevozu – trebaju primijeniti kako bi se odredila nadležnost ili priznali učinci 
presuda u određenom predmetu.
Ključne riječi: Briselska uredba Ia, pitanja nadležnosti ili priznavanja te primjene, 
tzv. klauzule rastavljanja, transportne konvencije
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